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Human Rights and Global Public Goods: The sound of one hand clapping? 
 
Neil Walker 
 
 
 
In a thought-provoking analysis, Daniel Augenstein has shone light on an under-examined set 
of connections between two key terms in our contemporary vocabulary of legal and political 
philosophy, namely public goods and human rights, and has begun to explore how these 
connections help us to address questions of planetary justice.1  In posing his title question thus 
- ‘to whom it may concern’ - he points us directly to the conflicted nature of the ethics of 
responsibility for our global well-being. On the one hand, we hear the familiar open-ended call 
to any and all audiences to be ‘concerned’, to take responsibility for what happens beyond the 
confines of the state and its citizenry. On the other hand, if we put the rhetorical appeal of the 
phrase to one side, a focus on the question ‘to whom’ highlights the problem of political 
authorship, and so of political authority.  Which of us, and by what means collectively 
constituted, has title and voice to assume concern for global politics and public policy?  Who 
is obliged to do so, who is even justified in so doing, and on what grounds, and with what 
implications for the content and extent of our common global commitments? And, just as 
importantly, who has the mobilizing capacity so to do? The questions remain as urgent (surely 
everyone of us shares responsibility for the many contemporary matters of palpable global 
concern, both immediate and long-term?) as their answers often appear elusive (but just how 
do we translate that shared responsibility into a defensible and effective politics of 
intervention?) 
'Public goods’ and ‘human rights’ each offer a partial set of answers. But are these 
answers overlapping or separate, interdependent or independent, complementary or 
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Public Goods 22 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES (2015) (forthcoming) 
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conflicting, complete or incomplete in their combined import? Acknowledging that they deal 
with distinct aspects of our global legal and political morality - the value of human rights is 
not, or not only, that they are public goods, just as the value of public goods is not exhausted 
by their contribution to human rights - Augenstein recognizes and examines some of the 
specific ways in which they are nevertheless interdependent and potentially complementary. 
But  in so doing he leaves open the question of the capacity of these two registers of political 
thought to provide, in combination, a general answer to the challenge of how to work out and 
how to operationalize our global ethics of collective responsibility.  
Yet for a number of reasons that open question remains an important and intriguing 
one. In the first place, there is the question of profile to which we have already alluded. Public 
goods and human rights are amongst the  most popular and visible contemporary carriers of 
ideas of global law and governance, and so prime candidates for any broader project of global 
justice.2 Secondly, each operates in a presumptively general or universal register. Public goods 
should in principle be available to any and all publics, while human rights speak in the name 
of all humanity. In both cases, therefore, the difficulty of freeing  the relevant conceptual 
apparatus from  a state-centred frame of reference need not be insurmountable. And thirdly,  
the two themes may appear to complement each other in their coverage of the substantive 
domain of global ethics. Whereas public goods focus on matters of collective provision, human 
rights continue to place the individual at their ethical centre. Their combination, therefore, may 
hold out the prospect of a fertile engagement between the two core concerns of modern political 
morality – our social obligations, requirements and potential on the one hand and our individual 
dignity and well-being on the other. 
In this short paper, I address this question of the larger potential of global public goods 
and human rights. In so doing, I take up a number of the cues provided by Augenstein and also 
pursue some lines of my own. My conclusion, however, is a sceptical one. For all their 
ambition, both public goods and human rights face the formidable challenge of placing 
considerations of political authority on the one hand and political morality on the other in 
productive balance. In the exploration of both themes, we seem to be faced with the frustrating 
                                                             
2  For discussion of their rise to prominence as candidate species of global law, see NEIL 
WALKER, INTIMATIONS OF GLOBAL LAW, ch.3 (2015) 
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phenomenon of one hand clapping - with a failure to reconcile authority and morality in a 
satisfactory manner. On the one side, the discourse of global public goods tends to suffer from 
a general deficit of political authority, which in turn reinforces the incompleteness of its claim 
at the level of political morality. On the other side, the discourse of human rights, perhaps 
surprisingly, has stronger authoritative roots, but these are locally situated, and the soil 
becomes very thin as we move away from the state to the broader global environment and the 
familiar yet ethically abstracted moral discourse of universal entitlement.  And in turn, I argue, 
it is just because both these dimensions of global ethics, public goods and human rights, face 
the same type of difficulty that their conjunction in a single scheme does not allow either to 
compensate for the deficiencies of the other. 
I. Public Goods and Global Justice 
Augenstein’s critique of the application of the standard economistic conception of public goods 
to a transnational setting follows a well-worn track, and ends up facing some familiar puzzles. 
The attraction of a notion of public goods no longer confined within national boundaries – from 
trade and environmental protection to climate change and security – is not fundamentally 
different from its attraction at a national level. For public goods provide presumptively 
politically non-contentious and morally unobjectionable reasons for common action on 
common problems, whether these sound at the national or at the global level, or, indeed, at any 
level in between.   
 Non-excludability of access and non-rivalness in consumption and are the two defining 
features of the standard model of public goods.3  These two features account for the key 
characteristics – high production costs, free rider problems and non-exhaustible benefits    – 
that militate against their adequate, efficient or equitable provision by private market actors. 
Basically, private actors tend to lack either the means or the motivation to supply such goods, 
and to the extent that they are able and willing to supply they are inclined to do so in an 
unnecessarily restrictive manner. This explains why such goods ought instead to be supplied 
and enjoyed as public goods.  
                                                             
3 See P. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure 36 THE REVIEW OF 
ECONOMICS AND STATISITCS  36,  387 (1954) 
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Yet these defining features are for the most part just matters of degree. Most   public 
goods, whether on a national or a global scale, are not ‘pure’ public goods. Instead, access to 
them may be restricted in some measure due to human intervention and technical manipulation, 
and they may be somewhat susceptible to depletion through consumption. In addition, even to 
the extent that public goods retain the attributes of non-excludability and non-rivalness and so 
may be more effectively provided publicly rather than privately, this does not place such 
provision beyond criticism and so beyond the realm of political contention. For such public 
provision may still vary significantly in intensity and quality, and the benefits it bestows will 
be received and experienced unevenly between different groups, while the balance and trade-
off between different public goods involves independent value choices over which 
disagreement  remains inevitable.  
 These objections apply, it should be noted, regardless of the type of public goods with 
which we are concerned. On the one hand, there are purely instrumental public goods, such 
as clean air, or street lighting, or the provision of other general utilities, where the emphasis is 
on the public means of delivery. On the other hand, there are communal public goods, where 
the public good in question makes reference not, or not only, to the collective modality and 
instrument of provision but to the collective context of its enjoyment. Such communal goods 
are public goods because the good in question is accomplished and appreciated in (relatively 
non-excludable and non-rival) common across a particular community. We are referring here 
to goods such as living in a tolerant society, or living in an educated society, or even – to take 
the case where our two categories do directly intersect, living in a society that respects human 
rights. We are also referring to a further sub-category of ‘essentially communal goods’4 such 
as a common language, or fraternity, or solidarity, where the good in question does not merely 
refer to a benefit that will be communally generated and widely shared within a given 
community, but is one where the benefit is realized as an experience-in common; that is to say, 
                                                             
4 See J. Waldron, Can Communal Goods be Human Rights? in LIBERAL RIGHTS: 
COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-91  354-358 (Jeremy Waldron, 1993) 
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where the very enjoyment of the good requires and implies its simultaneous enjoyment by 
others. 5 
 If we turn our attention specifically to public goods on a global scale, whether 
instrumental public goods or communal public goods, here we can identify a double political 
deficit - the two elements of which are closely related. In the first place, as we have already 
touched upon, there remains a deficit of political morality that is already well known at the 
national level. To identify something as a public good tells us only that we should make public 
provision for it, not precisely what that provision should be. There will inevitably be winners 
and losers and disputed priorities as regards the elaboration of each good. The precision of 
instrumental public goods suffers from inevitable disputation over what counts as an adequate 
means and level of provision, while the precision of communal pubic goods suffers from the 
abstractness of their specification. What is more, the relationship between the various goods is 
also highly contestable. As Augenstein points out, specification of the overall ‘public good’ to 
which various goods should contribute and which should inform the terms and balance of their 
realization also remains absent within the specialist and mutually compartmentalized 
discourses of public goods.    
 In the second place, there is a deficit of political authority, and here the global level 
acquires its own peculiar vulnerabilities. To name something as a public good does not tell us 
how we should manage to make provision for it.  We call something a public good because the 
mismatch between our interest in its benefit and our individual and joint motivation to provide 
it speaks to a collective action problem.  But to say that this requires an equivalent at the global 
level to the public institution and public good provider of the state at the national level begs 
the question.  We simply do not yet have such institutions in place, or at least have them only 
unevenly and often embryonically or of fragile standing (think of global public health or 
climate change regimes for example, still less global educational regimes). This, in turn, 
reflects back upon two interlinked problems of political morality. A first concerns the 
aforementioned indeterminacy and attendant controversy over the justifiable substantive terms 
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JOSEPH RAZ , THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM  255-62 (1986); IAN LOADER & NEIL 
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of the provision of global public goods. The problem of precision becomes amplified at the 
global level just because we often lack institutions that are recognized as having the legitimate 
authority to make difficult choices over level and quality of provision. A second and underlying 
problem concerns the satisfaction of the very threshold case for public provision at the level of 
the global or transnational community to complement the (largely) accepted need for its 
provision at the nation state level. This is particularly so at the level of communal public goods. 
To accept the need for instrumental public goods at the global level in areas such as climate 
change and disease control requires only an informed and enlightened self-interest – a sense 
that our own community well-being depends upon the well-being of other communities being 
similarly secured – and a level of mutual trust sufficient to ground the credibility of common 
commitments made on the basis of such enlightened self-interest. Even here, the difficulties of 
achieving and implementing common institutional cause remain profound. Yet to accept the 
need for communal public goods at the global level, such as an ethic of mutual toleration, or 
the common benefits of living in an educated community, or in a community where we value 
the varied riches of our artistic or wider cultural inheritance, the global level requires something 
more – namely a prior recognition that for some purposes of our community membership and 
participation, the globe itself (or some significant part of it) counts as the relevant unit of 
society at which the unit-wide distribution and shared enjoyment of a good presumptively 
matters to all sharers. 
  So we should not be surprised that we struggle to find the political means to provide 
any, still less a sufficient authoritative mechanism of public goods provision at the global level. 
To think otherwise, to assume that the broad need for something that requires collective 
provision, even if that broad need comes to be broadly acknowledged, will lead to agreement 
over its collective provision is to commit a functionalist fallacy – or at least to live in excessive 
functionalist hope. 
 We can better understand both the attractions and the limitations of the public goods 
approach if we locate it within a broader framework of philosophical thought about global 
justice.6  Crudely, we can understand the requirements of global justice in terms of three 
different models of global connectedness. We can order these progressively, from thinner to 
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thicker expectations of joint action and conceptions of underlying connectedness. First, there 
is a model of concurrent interests. Secondly, there is a model of mutual responsibility. 
Thirdly, there is a model of common concern.  
  The concurrent interests model concentrates on those areas where, regardless of cultural 
and ethical differences, we are manifestly interdependent in certain key domains of social life. 
In these domains, the globe has become a community of palpably common risk and interwoven 
life-chances. The emphasis here is upon clear and often urgent areas of shared and interactive 
predicament and prospect between states and peoples; where both the common harm or benefit, 
and the fact that we have been and remain in a position to act to cause or prevent such harm or 
secure such benefit to one another, is undeniable and unavoidable. 7 
 The mutual responsibility model reaches beyond the manifest interdependence of the 
concurrent interest model to find a deeper seam of causation and associated obligation. The 
guiding premise here, perhaps most forcefully portrayed  and most extensively developed today 
in the work of Thomas Pogge,8 is that the very arrangement of the world into sovereign states 
and their peoples  (with the international resource, borrowing, treaty, and arms privileges 
consecrated by that state-sovereigntist arrangement) and the institutional configuration of state-
centred international law and politics that reflects this, is no neutral framework or international 
‘state of nature’. Rather, it is a background structure with significant and uneven effects on the 
global distribution of benefits and burdens. In particular, the historical embedding and 
perpetuation of these arrangements in ways that systematically favour some parts of the globe 
over others, specifically those that have been prominent in the original design and continuing 
refinement of the system, accounts for many of the world’s deep inequalities, including the 
catastrophe of global poverty.  It follows from this deeper investigation of the causal dynamics 
of the world order that those states and their citizens who are responsible for inequalities and 
other distributive injustices are under a duty to correct or mitigate the harm that we have caused, 
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justice both within the political classes and in the academy. See e.g. Hutchings, above, 
fn6, ch.1. 
8 See in particular THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2nd ed. 
2008) 
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which require a level of compensatory common action much greater than under the concurrent 
interests model.  
The common concern model, finally, argues for a deeper framework of mutual 
commitment and obligation just in view of our common humanity.9 In other words, it is not the 
proximity of our actions and action-effects and the greater or lesser interdependence due to that 
proximity that leads us to take responsibility for each other, or to recognize concurrent interests 
and the associated entanglement of predicaments and prospects, but a deeper affinity and 
solidarity as members of the same species. 
All three models become increasingly salient under conditions of globalization. Our 
manifest interdependence in the face of climate change, pandemic disease, global insecurity 
etc., increases. So too does recognition of the deeper dynamics of the interdependence of our 
life-chances, as also, partly on account of this denser web of interconnections, does a 
cosmopolitan awareness of our common human condition.  Yet the solutions and responses 
suggested are different. The public goods approach, certainly in its instrumental dimension, 
clearly belongs to the first model – that of concurrent interests, with its emphasis on manifest 
interdependence. Even communal public goods, though they speak at least minimally to some 
prior sense of global community and the common concern that implies, also respond to the 
concurrent interests model to the extent that they argue for the provision of goods (e.g. human 
rights protection for all, toleration of other cultures) that need not involve high levels of 
resource redistribution and which remain directly relevant to the satisfaction of ones own local 
interests. In general terms, the second and third models, with their thicker sense of common 
ties, are more likely to generate notions of global economic redistribution and social reform, 
and enhanced global institutional capacity, that go beyond those we associate with public 
goods.  
Of course, the different approaches need not be mutually exclusive. It is perfectly 
possible to subscribe to the concurrent interests, mutual responsibility and common concern 
models together, and most who subscribe to the public goods model would make at least some 
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concession to the other two. For example, this may be through recognition of the moral 
jeopardy of untrammelled state sovereignty and a concern to mitigate its effects through 
doctrines of humanitarian intervention and basic rights protection under the mutual 
responsibility model;10 or through acknowledgement of at least minimum standards of species-
wide humanitarian assistance,11 or – as already noted - the recognition of a minimum sense of 
global community in respect of communal public goods, under the common concern model. 
Yet for all that, important differences remain. The stress upon one rather than the other 
approaches tends to reveal distinct and in some measure rival mentalities of global governance. 
And the mentality of global governance associated with the public goods approach is 
undoubtedly a presumptively modest one. It involves no deep interrogation of the underlying 
state system, and assumes that much public provision should tend to remain state-based and 
state-justified. It assumes the global political sphere to be merely supplementary, and one that 
that is both truncated in terms of its consideration of common ends and the search for a 
deliberated international consensus, and fragmented in form. Truncated because its emphasis 
is largely on areas of close interdependence and already apparent manifest common cause. 
Fragmented because it tends to deal with the public goods associated with each of these areas 
discretely. 12 
This still leaves open the overall vision to which the adoption of the public goods 
approach in any particular instance is linked. The modesty of a public goods approach may 
reflect an overall modesty of ambition and justification of intervention in matters of global 
justice on the part of its sponsors. Or its modesty may be more strategic or instrumental, merely 
a recognition of the need to establish a secure platform of basic goods before moving onto 
                                                             
10 See e.g. R. Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law’  41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF 2 
(2013). 
11 See e.g. T. Nagel The Problem of Global Justice  33  PHIL. & PUB. AFF.113 (2005); see 
also JOHN RAWLS , THE LAW OF PEOPLES  (1999). 
12 The precise mode of treatment will differ depending upon whether we are dealing 
with single shot, aggregate or weakest link public goods, but in any case our current 
transnational institutional infrastructure seems weakly equipped, and vulnerable to 
capture by strong ideological or epistemic interests. See e.g. G. Schaffer International 
Law and Global Public Goods in a Pluralist World,  23 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 669 (2012); N. Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in 
an Age of Global Public Goods 1O8 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  
1(2014). 
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deeper and more contentious matters. In this regard, moreover, the sense of prior global 
community implicit in the communal public goods approach, however lightly registered, hints 
at a more progressive attitude. So too does the easy semantic link, made by Augenstein and 
others, between the multiplicity of global public goods and the singular global public good – 
the latter a standard that beckons us to take into account in a strong sense not only concurrent 
interests, but also mutual responsibilities and common concerns. 
  But whether intrinsic and limited in final ambition or strategic and unlimited, it is that 
same modesty of immediate vision and orientation that questions or restricts the value of the 
global public goods approach. As we have already seen, the public goods approach tries to 
sidestep the problem of political authority through the apparent self-evidence of its objectives 
at the level of political morality. But here we encounter the first problem of one hand clapping. 
Any effective solution at the level of political morality is likely to be undermined by the 
absence of political authority. The two hands need to meet. If they do not do so on account of 
a deficit of political authority, the claims of substance at the level of political morality may 
either over-reach and fail to be implemented, or be prey to unilateral implementation by a non-
globally representative yet hegemonic political power;13 or, as is more likely for most global 
public goods, its may under-reach in compensation for a lack of political authority. In addition, 
the lack of political authority is liable to be reinforced by the poverty of transnational public 
political engagement and mobilization that any such narrow and fragmented agenda of 
institutional treatment of global public goods is apt to generate. 
II. Rights between community and humanity 
If the problem of global public goods is that their intended contribution at the level of 
substantive political morality is not matched at the level of political authority, which in turn 
weakens what can be resolved at the level of political morality, to what extent, if any, can the 
discursive and institutional possibilities of international human rights help tackle the problem? 
                                                             
13 See e.g., J. Habermas, Does the Constitutionalization of International Law still have a 
chance? in THE DIVIDED WEST  ch.8 (J. Habermas, 2006).  Here Habermas’s main 
concern is to critique the role of the United States as an ‘enlightened hegemon’ in the 
unipolar political world of the opening years of the 21st century. 
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Augenstein makes two interesting moves towards answering this question. In the first 
place, he wants to use an expansive notion of human rights as a way of treating the problem of 
political authority – of accounting for why and how it is that certain levels of political 
community do authoritatively resolve to put and keep things in common. In the second place, 
he wants to argue that there is something dynamic and reflexive in this process, that human 
rights are not simply the glue of an already settled sense of political community, although they 
are in part that, but also a lubricant that can unsettle existing conceptions of the boundaries of 
political community. These two moves are captured in Augenstein’s idea that human rights are 
‘constitutive’ in relation to ‘the (overall) public good’ as this is defined by and in turn defines a 
community.  
First, then, there is the basic question of the constitutive role of human rights in the 
generation of political community. Augenstein’s key insight here is that human rights are 
integral to the fashioning of political community inasmuch as they contribute ‘to the 
legitimation of state power by re-presenting the general interest of the polity that is not 
reducible to the aggregated economic self-interest of ‘isolated’ liberal individuals or the 
provision of functionally differentiated public goods.’  That is to say, whereas public goods 
speak to a deracinated notion of what outcomes are good for any community, and whereas a 
certain narrow sense of liberal rights speaks in a universal register, and so is likewise 
deracinated, a broader conception of human rights allows the community to give particular 
meaning to it polity – to become the co-authors of its own specific version of an overall public 
good that includes but is not exhausted by the aggregation of public goods or the protection of 
economic freedom. That broader conception is one that refers, in Habermasian terms, to the 
‘co-originality’ of private autonomy (through economic and other liberty rights) and public 
autonomy (political rights) in the making of political community, and also to their symbiosis – 
with political freedom dependent upon the exercise of personal freedom and vice-versa.14 
Certain features of the structure of rights protection, according to Augenstein, help reinforce 
this idea of a particularizing function, including their polity-pervasive, cross-sectoral remit and 
their typical textual qualification by considerations of ‘common interest’, ‘public policy’ and 
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similar terms. It seems therefore, both that human rights are part of the basic recipe, 
universally applicable, for the making of political community, and that they supply the 
distinguishing and particularizing ingredient ‘baked into’ the dish that any particular 
constituency of  ‘we, the people’ might serve up.  
I have reservations about just how much work the idea of rights might be required to do 
within our political ethics from this perspective.15 It is not clear to what extent a vernacular 
conception of rights can contributes to a common sense of political morality sufficient to 
transform our picture of public goods in aggregate into a thickly mediated sense of the public 
good; and insofar as rights are conducive of political community, much of the weight must be 
borne not by the basic category of liberty rights but by the ‘public autonomy’ process rights of 
democratic voice and political participation. This point will be pursued in due course, yet for 
the moment let us give Augenstein his due. For by indicating how human rights does not simply 
represent the universal dimension in our political morality, as many assume, but is also a source 
of its particularizing dimension, and of the sense of legitimate authority associated with the 
collective articulation of that particularizing dimension, he insists on an important point 
Yet, secondly, in making that point, Augenstein wants to stress the open-ended and 
critically reflexive quality of the   search for human rights. For him, ‘a political collective that 
commits to protecting human rights empowers its members to invoke humanity against the 
polity.’ (emphasis added)  Clearly, the invocation of humanity speaks to the capacity of the 
citizenry of the polity to take a critical stance and to adapt and revise their understanding of 
how rights are implicated in their political community. But of more relevance to us, it also 
opens the door to the consideration of the relationship between the polity in question and wider 
human rights claims issuing from beyond the polity. For if, as Augenstein suggests, the proper 
relationship between the particular polity and general humanity is the reflexive inquiry that 
always lies at the heart of human rights claims, then it is a challenge that can be posed – and a 
claim that in principle should be capable of being raised – by outsiders affected by the actions 
of a polity as much as by insiders. As Augenstein says, this is already implicit in the 
constitutional protection of human rights we accord to resident non-citizens as well as to state 
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iterative relationship 39 RECHTSFILOSOFIE & RECHTSTHEORIE 206 92010) 
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citizens, and more pertinently, in the shifting and expanding international law jurisprudence on 
the extra-territorial human rights obligations of states. 
I have considerable sympathy for the idea of the field of human rights developing in 
accordance with an on-going dialectic of the particular and the universal. Indeed, in other work, 
I have tried to show that it is the irreducible element of universality in all human rights 
discourse – the claim to speak on behalf of all humanity and of their claims as equal rights 
holders – that has led to a powerful rhetorical inclusiveness and expansiveness of rights-holding 
communities and a similar open-endedness of subject matter. 16  On the one hand, the 
remorseless claim to universalism carries obvious dangers, as it can lead to illegitimate 
generalization from very specific modes of life, interest constellations and conceptions of 
human flourishing. Yet on the other hand, the insistent ambition of universalism invites 
alternative or additional narratives of rights in the same universal code. The assumption of a 
universalism of personal scope in rights language and the internal relationship of the idea of 
rights protection to a notion of human agency and dignity that entitles these  agents to become 
reflexively responsible for the best understanding of what their human rights catalogue 
includes,17 has been behind the dramatic worldwide expansion of rights charters and their 
‘indivisible’ range of subject matter (including second generation socio-economic rights and 
third generation group and collective rights) in national and international charters and their 
institutional supports since the post-War formation of the UN and its Declaration of Human 
Rights.18  And in this expansion we can see not just a one-sided particularism, but a gradual 
invocation and partial reconciliation of different particular visions of human rights at higher 
levels of agreement and institutionalization.  
                                                             
16 See N. Walker, Universalism and Particularism in Human Rights: Trade-off or 
Productive Tension?  In HUMAN RIGHTS: OLD PROBLEMS, NEW POSSIBILITIES 89 
(David Kinley, Wojciech Sadurski & Kevin Walton (eds) 2013)  
17 See e.g., J. Waldron, Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights? in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 117 ( Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao and Massimo 
Renzo (eds) 2015). 
18 Ever since the Vienna Declaration adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights 
in Vienna in 1993, the ‘indivisible, interdependent and interrelated’ character of human 
rights has been routinely stressed in the public discourse of transnational human rights. 
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But, beyond these rhetorical and legal-textual developments, we must be careful how 
far the language of rights will take us in effectively complementing a global language of public 
goods. For it is telling that Augenstein continues to focus on states, and states alone,  as the 
basic units of rights production and protection (and, of course, of their violation and 
encroachment) in a globalizing world. In so doing, certainly, he wants to stress the extent to 
which the rights-based responsibilities of states increasingly extend beyond their territories, 
especially as regards the question of the occupation of foreign territories and the various 
transnational public goods and ‘bads’, in particular peace and (in)security,  which may be 
associated with such occupation. Yet for all that the International Court of Justice and UN 
Treaty bodies, in particular the Committee  on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, have 
been vigorous in promoting extraterritorial application, this remains very much a secondary 
agenda behind the domestic rights jurisdiction of states. 
What is more, the international institutional and normative architecture of rights 
protection within and around the UN, however densely developed, remains very much an 
external source of instructions or exhortations to states to modify their actions, rather than 
signaling the emergence of regional or global political communities with their own state-
independent authoritative foundations. Indeed, in the one place where the rescaling of political 
community beyond the state has made significant advances, namely the regional case of the 
EU, the driving force has not been human rights. Rather, it has been the expanding common 
political objectives of the supranational entity, with human rights playing a complementary but 
essentially subsidiary role in reaction to and as a secondary influence upon these expanding 
common objectives.19 
The nub of the matter is that while human rights can be authoritatively ‘constitutive’ of 
the political community of the state in the sense that, as Augenstein indicates, they play a key 
role in  the imaginative reconstruction of community as something other than and beyond ‘a 
pre-determined ethical self-understanding of the national community’, they still require that 
presupposition of national community – and all the sociological ingredients of common life 
that makes such a presupposition possible – as a point of collective orientation for their  work 
                                                             
19  See e.g. A Von Bogdandy The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? 37 
COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 1307 (2000) 
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of political imagination. That is to say, there remains an important respect in which the 
‘constitutive’ construction through rights of national political community, and, more 
pertinently, of any other potential level of political community beyond the state, can only get 
off the ground if there is an existing cultural affinity – a rudimentary ‘we feeling’ - of which it 
can supply a reconstruction. 20 
III  The Inaudibility of Global Justice 
In the final analysis, we cannot wish for what is not plausibly available to us. As he seeks to 
complement and moderate the pursuit of global public goods, presented as a modestly 
progressive but still institutionally-lite and culturally detached transnational force of political 
morality, with a human rights-centred force of political authority, Augenstein is surely correct 
to insist that the authoritative roots - if not the imaginative heights - of human rights discourse 
remain located within the state rather than at some higher level of political institutionalization.  
Yet despite this  mismatch of levels, can  human rights  supply an effective accompaniment 
and stimulus in the register of global political authority to the construction of the public good, 
more broadly conceived, in the register of global political morality?  
We must, in conclusion, doubt that this is the case. In the final analysis human rights 
discourse possesses a dual and interrelated  legacy that limits its ambition at the global level. 
Not only does the authoritative foundations of rights and rights enforcement remain firmly 
state-centred. In addition, and closely associated with that state-centredness, the original and  
‘first generational’ form of rights has been  one of shielding individuals from the excesses of 
political power, and so, more specifically,  from the various governmental organs of the state - 
understood as the monopolistic holder of political power of the modern age. And while the 
shift towards extra-territorial jurisdiction and towards human rights claims  as imposing 
positive as well as negative obligations on states – as swords as well as shields - is an ongoing 
                                                             
20 See e.g. H. Lindahl Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of 
Collective Selfhood in THE PARADOX OF CONSTTIUTIIONALISM, 9 (Martin Loughlin & 
Neil Walker (eds), 2007). 
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affair,21 the magnetic centre of human rights law is still the domestic state environment and the 
liberal project of constraining state power over individuals within that statist box.22 That 
structural bias remains, and is reinforced by longstanding doctrines of sovereign autonomy and 
non-interference which continue to serve as a brake upon any and all attempts to extend the 
responsibility of states for those of their rights-related  actions and action-consequences that 
are experienced beyond their borders.  
This suggests how far what remains a basically locally cultivated  human rights 
discourse - its easy resonance in the contemporary circuits of international law and policy 
notwithstanding - is from providing the authoritative ballast for the development of a more 
expansively justice-sensitive conception of the public good at a global level. More generally, 
it is a conclusion that, in demonstrating the problems encountered even  by  such promisingly 
open-ended candidates  as human rights and public goods, reminds us of how difficult it is to 
adapt any nationally nurtured legal or political discourse to global requirements.23 Once again 
we see (and do not hear) one hand clapping – this time the old hand of state-based political 
authority. Yet absent the kind of fertile transnational cultural soil in which distinctively 
political rights of public autonomy24 can become embedded anew and actively re-employed, 
but which, crucially, such rights  cannot independently generate, the prospect of this hand being 
brought together with the hand of an expansively engaged and developed conception  of the 
global public good in the name of global justice remains dim.25 And what the ensuing silence 
                                                             
21  See e.g. , the developing area of state responsibility for the extra-territorial human 
rights violations of global business entities registered within the home jurisdiction; D. 
Augenstein and D. Kinley, Beyond the 100 Acre Wood: in which international law finds 
new ways to tame global corporate power THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW (forthcoming) (2015) 
22 See e.g. ANDREW VINCENT, THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2010). Vincent 
stresses the continuing civilizing effect of national structures and standards in 
sponsoring international human rights protection today, describing national citizens’ 
rights, which remain predominantly negative rights against the state, as ‘mentors’(2) of 
international human rights.  
23  See further, Walker fn 2 above, ch.6 
24  See Habermas, fn14 above. 
25 Pogge (above fn 7) seeks to use a right-based argument to add ballast to his case for a 
mutual responsibility based redistribution of resources to alleviate global poverty. He 
argues that  our domestic position as rights-holders within Western states  makes us co-
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indicates is just how much any such broader conception struggles to he heard within our 
existing constellation of political authority.  
The contribution of the idea of global public goods and of human rights, separately and 
in combination, to the alleviation of global wrongs, must remain, therefore, a decidedly less 
ambitious one. Indeed, I believe that Augenstein and I are in basic agreement on this, and that, 
in fact, is why he devotes his analysis to the intricacies of the modest contribution global public 
goods and human rights can make to the improvement of international law and politics rather 
than to the larger canvas of global justice. Yet, that modest contribution is also one that 
becomes all the more important in light of the very elusiveness of any project carrying a higher 
global ambition – an elusiveness that my examination of the difficulties confronting our twin 
themes’ own candidature for any such exalted task has hopefully served to illustrate. 
  
                                                             
responsible for those structurally advantaged economic policies of  Western states and 
their governments that cause global poverty.  Yet whatever its long-term merits as 
frame-changing,  transformative political philosophy, an argument which deploys a 
traditionally state-internal, non-interference based discourse of legal authority to 
authorize a state-external interventionist-based programme of action  remains 
institutionally implausible today. In other words, in terms of our understanding of the 
claims that can be effectively made under the existing state-sovereigntist  framework of 
legal and political authority, Pogge’s approach lacks traction. 
